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Since the fields of symbolic interaction and ethnomethodology
have been increasingly linked in recent sociological writings, the
author examines the generalizing concepts of George Herbert Mead--
theoretical fountainhead of symbolic interaction-- and Alfred
Schutz--phenomenological sociologist and theoretical godfather of
ethnomethodology.
Similarities of content abound in the writings of these two
men, e.g., analysis of the self, other, language, social act,
motives, ends or projects, mind, consciousness, duree, and the
vivid present. However, their methodological positions diverge
sharply with the result that their generalizing concepts are
dissimilar.
For Mead "forms" are abstractions of real, objective, and
natural phenomena and part of a morphological system; for Schutz,
"types" are conventions and part of a static, typological system
and ultimately dependent upon consensus. Mead seeks to explain
processes of emergence and change of social forms; Schutz seeks
to describe and understand subjective human action in terms of
typicalities. Ultimately both generalizing concepts do rely on
subjective interpretations or inductive leaps at the point at
which the allocation of particulars to forms or types is left to
the subjective judgment of the observer or sociologist.
Sociologists should thus exercise caution in drawing parallels
between symbolic interaction and ethnomethodology or phenomeno-
logical sociology. Further research of Schutz's conception of
the world of everyday life as one of typicalities is certainly
warranted. Indeed, a sociology of knowledge based on such
typicalities and their systems of relevance is a promising
possibility.
Sociology, like the other social sciences, has from its inception made
extensive use of generalizing concepts. This fact is abundantly attested in
introductory texts, dictionaries of 'sociology, and innumerable theoretical
treatises. Indeed, recent interest in theory construction has contributed to
a renewed concern with the nature of such terms. Distinctions between and among
them, however, are not at all clear, and some sociologists use terms such as
class, construct, type, ideal type, typology, classification, form, model, global
concept or even definition or concept in a rather loose way. Theodorson and
Theodorson, in a rather admirable attempt to compile a dictionary of sociological
terms, have used Mead's notions of "I," "me," and "generalized other" as
illustrations of "constructs" even though Mead himself considered them to be
emergent "forms" (Modern Dictionary of Sociology:74).
Usage of generalizing concepts does entail, of course, assumptions and problems
of application which most sociologists only vaguely or intermittently recognize.
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Although an examination of these problems sometimes leads into the realms of
methodology and the philosophy of science, it seems at times a necessary task in
the interest of theoretical clarity and progress.
The present paper originated from a comparative analysis of symbolic inter-
action and what has come to be known as phenomenological sociology, particularly
as represented in the writings of George Herbert Mead and Alfred Schutz. This
author found the fact that both men described certain patterned behavior similarly
but generalized it differently rather puzzling. What Mead referred to as a "role"
and related to the emergence of the self, Schutz typified as a "course of action"
and related it to his rather intricate system. Was this merely a linguistic
convenience, or were the theoretical contexts of these two rPproaches basically
similar as a number of sociologists have recently insisted. Related to this
question was a lesser one, namely the synonymous usage of the terms "form" and
"species" in the writings of Mead, which seemed unusual given the prevailing
association of "forms" with the Kantian categories (Mead, 1964:3-18). Moreover,
Mead wanted to be known as a social behaviorist; Schutz, a follower of Husserl,
appeared as the more thoroughgoing idealist.
Thus, the present analysis which began as a rather narrowly delimited task of
distinguishing the notions of "form" and "type" led to an awareness of more
fundamental philosophical differences between an empiricist and an idealist con-
struction of generalized concepts. For Mead the term "form" applies to an emergent
from the objective life process, and for Schutz the notion of "type" is a cognitive
convention which is simply present as part of the social tradition and human inter-
action.
For the research sociologist a myriad of questions present themselves in the
application and use of types and forms. Do these terms really refer to structures,
functions, or some sort of visible attributes? By what process can they be
established? Should the scientist enumerate and identify a series of characteris-
tics (and if so on what basis does he select them), or should he perform a sub-
jective judgment to determine a given type or form. If the latter, what effect
does it have on his commitment to an "empirical science"? Or is a type simply a
statistical average or central tendency? Furthermore, how are particular instances,
especially marginal cases, to be allocated to the generalizing term? If, as some
scholars maintain, a type is an ideal or an idea for which no empirical instances--
only approximations--can be found, who is to decide whether a specific instance
illustrates a type, for example, is a cancer patient who refuses to go to the
doctor committing suicide? And who should judge the action as typical, the actor
or the observer?
These -'-then are some of the broader methodological considerations which form
the background for the present paper on the analysis of the terms "form" and "type"
in Schutz and Mead.
I
The context for Mead's use of the terms "form" and "species" was the dis-
tinction between two versions of the theory of evolution, an organic one--as found
in the writings of the naturalists such as Darwin and Lamarck--and an earlier
philosophical theory of evolution found in the writings of the Romantic idealists,
especially Hegel. Hegel had proposed, wrote Mead, that there is an encompassing
process, guided by an Absolute, which produces new forms when a new synthesis arises
from the conflict of two "universals"--a thesis and an anti-thesis--which seeks
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resolution in a new synthesis (Mead, 1964; Mead, 1936:127-152). While Mead admired
this Hegelian stress on the emergence of forms, he criticized it for viewing the
conflict as one between two "universals"; in fact, argued Mead, the opposition is
between a univ~rsal--a thesis or theory--and a "particular"--a fact in the world
of nature which does not bear out the theory. In its attempt at reconciling the
ensuing conflict, a synthesis emerges, a new theory, a new form. Science works
precisely in this dialectic fashion, as could be amply illustrated from such
discoveries as the conquest of typhoid fever in medicine. By stressing the emer-
gence of forms, Romantic idealism had thus broken with the Kantian position that
forms preexist in the mind and provide the structure for all human experience.
Mead considered this turning away from a theory of static and a priori forms to one
stressing the development of forms in a larger process of experience as correct.
At the same time, Mead also rejected the older mechanical position in science
because it provided no explanation for the emergence of forms at all: "the
mechanical conception of the world did not seem to be one that gave any explanation
to the form of things (Mead, 1964:7). Mechanical science could analyze wholes into
parts but could not account for the form of objects--trees, plants, animals, etc.
Indeed, forms had no meaning for them! But, insisted Mead, the world of experience
is a world of forms, and a scientific explanation of forms had to be provided
(Mead, 1964:8).
In this context, Mead introduced the findings of Darwin in The Origin of
Species, for he had attempted not only to describe the plants and animals that
exist, but to explain how plant and animal forms had arisen from a natural process.
Nor was the term "species" unusual, argued Mead, for "species" is nothing but the
Latin word for "form." Indeed, the theory of evolution is a theory which "under-
takes to explain how the forms of things may arise" (Mead, 1964:9). It is there-
fore concerned with origins or causation and is more than a mere classifying of
kinds that already exist.
According to Mead, Darwin, the leading exponent of organic evolution, assumed
that in the beginning there was relatively formless protoplasm from which life forms
gradually emerged through a natural process. Significantly this was a theory of
the evolution of the form and not of the particular individual animal or plant--as
one might have in embryology or genetic theories. "What this theory is interested
in is the evolution of the nature of the object, of the form, in a metaphysical
sense" (Mead, 1964:10, emphasis mine). Taking his cue from Mal thus , theory of
population, Darwin had argued that certain variations of forms result when the
pressure of overpopulation forces those plants and animals to survive who are most
fit and best adapted to the conditions of life. This culling out process would
lead to the emergence of new forms. There is thus a separate life process and the
forms of life within it; the process and the forms are separate. This same process
exists in plants and animals from the simplest separation of carbon and oxygen to
the most complex; it flows through all life forms. The theory of evolution "involves
a process as its fundamental fact," and this process appears in different forms.
Forms or species are thus the product of the fundamental life process.
On the whole Mead's interpretation of Darwin is correct. Darwin had sought to
establish through observation and description of animal and plant life the species
and sub-species existing in the world of his time, and to explain this existence
more adequately than the earlier theory of Divine intervention or Divine Creation
of individual species. He was particularly aware of the inability of the theory of
Divine Creation to explain the existence of variations or sub-species (Darwin, 1899:
456). Nor was Darwin alone in his pursuits. Other scientists were engaged in
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similar undertakings, and surprisingly the terms "form," "species," and "type"
appear interchangeably in the literature. Thomas Huxley wrote in 1859,
we view 'Persistent Types' in relation to that hypothesis which
s~pposes the species living at any time to ~e the result of the
gradual modification of preexisting species, a hypothesis which,
though unproven . is yet the only one to which physiology lends
any countenance .•• (Darwin, 1899:xiv).
Darwin himself realized clearly that the terms "species" and varieties were used
with various connotations by different naturalists and that no one definition suited
everyone., Still he seemed satisfied with the fact that "every naturalist knows
vaguely what he means when he speaks of a species" (Darwin, 1899:39). In part, the
problem of the meaning of species and varieties was related to the criteria used to
distinguish them: sometimes subvarieties were considered the result of different
climatic conditions (plants in the Alps are smaller), isolation, or structure. Yet
structural differences--as in ants for instance--are hardly indicators of sub-
varieties~ The criteria for determining membership in a species or the defining
characteristics of a species are not simply related to size, structure or distri-
bution, but depend to a considerable extent on subjective interpretation. And
Darwin realized that in actual practice, naturalists tended to rely on scientific
consensus, the "sound judgment and wide experience" of fellow naturalists (Darwin,
1899:41,46). Novices have to learn these criteria for determining species not
simply from observing particular plants and animals, but from their contact and
interaction with fellow scientists. Since Darwin believed in gradualism--the fine
gradation of individual differences in the natural world--the allocation of individ-
ual instances to species was a task of high priority.
For present purposes, Darwin's substantive writings are not of primary
importance. Rather, our interest is in the fact that he construed the natural world
as comprised of forms, which naturalists distinguished as types or species, sub-
species and varieties. He firmly believed in the existence of natural resemblances
in the world of animals and plants, no matter whether they were called species or
sub-species. In connection with the latter distinction he wrote:
. • . that I look at the term species as one arbitrarily given, for
the sake of convenience, to a set of individuals closely resembling
each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term
variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating forms.
The term variety, again, in comparison with mere individual differences,
is also applied arbitrarily, for convenience's sake (Darwin, 1899:47).
Do species exist or are they merely ~erbal conveniences?
The difficulty of assigning particulars to places in the natural classifica-
tion was increased by Darwin's commitment to gradualism, the belief in the exis-
tence of infinite diversity in nature and natural development, or as it has come
to be known, "Natura non facit saltum." Thus the judgment of the naturalist
assumes great importance in recognizing individuals as belonging to particular kinds
or forms in the natural order of life. Yet there is no doubt that Darwin believed
in the actual existence of life forms, even though the definition of the terms
species and sub-species might be arbitrary.
In the context of the present paper it is significant that Mead mis-interpreted
Darwin as deriving the origin of forms from a vague formlessness. While Darwin
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did deny Divine Creation of all forms, he admitted to the belief in a few original
forms of life--and who knows where they had corne from~ He wrote that all subse-
quent forms had evolved from a few primordeal ones through natural selection:
. . . I cannot doubt that the theory of descent with modification
embraces all the members of the same great class or kingdom. I believe
that animals are descended ·from at most only four or five progenitors,
and plants from an equal or lesser number (Darwin, 1899:469).
And somewhat later, in defending his theory as not entirely beyond Divine inter-
vention:
When I view all being not as special creations but as the lineal descend-
ants of some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the
Cambrian system was deposited, they seem to be to become enabled (Darwin,
1899:473).
In short, Darwin held that present life forms are by gradual differentiation and
survival of the fittest derived from a very few original forms whose source he
left undisclosed, except to say that all life "having been originally breathed by
the Creator into a few forms or into one" (Darwin, 1899:473).
Mead saw Darwin's theory of the natural process whereby forms emerge as only
one phase of the even more general life process which exists everywhere. "We are
concerned with a theory which involves a process as its fundamental fact, and then
with this process as appearing in different forms" (Mead, 1964:13). Another phase
of this process, as Mead interpreted it, was the dynamic process of the self with
its alternating forms of subject and object. The process takes place within the
form, but is still distinguishable from it. "Form" as Mead uses the term here,
seems to refer to the structural configurations, separately or as wholes: "we could
not have the process if there were not some structure given, some particular form in
which it expresses itself" (1964:14). The social form, whatever it may be, will
survive, be modified or disappear in its interaction or adjustment with the
conditions around it, just as occurs in organic evolution.
Mead also took his cues from the Romantic idealists and held that the self
as a form must be viewed in its relations to the social conditions in which it
exists; and the human form must be recognized as part of the social whole. Under-
lying the emergence of the human form is a life process of adjustment of a simpler
form to the changing conditions around it. The Romantic idealists were thus
correct in viewing all social phenomena in relation to a context, to sets of
conditions--that is, as a self to a nonself, or subject to object. But Mead placed
even greater stress on the self in relation to the social organization and the
interactive process whereby the form of self emerges.
Based on his interpretation of both Darwin's organic evolution and Hegel's
Romantic idealism, Mead was convinced that process was the fundamental fact of
all life. Life itself is a moving whole and the life forms which emerge within it
from earlier or simpler forms do so in their adjustments to the conditions of their
existence. The process thus always entails forms adjusting to the conditions in
their environment in a fashion similar to the Hegelian dialectic except that the
problem calling for resolution is always a particular fact and not a universal.
From this perspective Mead examined the thought systems of others, praising
what he admired, criticizing what ill-fitted his own orientation. For instance, he
admired Bergson's theory of time and his notion of the emergence of forms in the
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process of duration, but rejected his parallelism between experience--or qualities
and images--and knowledge--quantities and concepts--because they rested on an
unacceptable notion of intuition. And just as all forms were emergents and subject
to change, so scientific knowledge was for Mead always tentative, hypothetical,
an approximation of reality and subject to new developments in the life process.
Although Mead did not systematically present all social forms as emergences
from the life process, many of them can be identified and their development
indicated. The three basic notions of self, society and mind with which he pre-
occupied himself might function as our points of departure.
Actually, Mead discusses not only one but two kinds of selves, the familiar
individual self and a collective self. The existence and reality of both is never
doubted and they are both presented as emergents from the general life process.
The collective, or historical self which Mead described emerged as part of the
Romantic movement in Europe through a process of role playing very much like 'that
among young children. Assumedly such an historical self awareness can exist at
any time, but Mead provided only this one detailed illustration. During the
Napoleonic period, he tells us, the nationalistic spirit in Europe, especially in
France, was so strong that the earlier class and caste ascriptions became
insignificant and citizenship in the nation made everyone equal. Everyone was a
Frenchman and equal in his citizen status to everyone else. This feeling of freedom
and equality persisted into the post-revolution years when the disillusionments
politically led many men to seek a reestablishment of the older social order. But
these new men, with new equalitarian attitudes, accustomed to political rights
irrespective of class, caste and occupation, could n~ver really return to an older
way of life. They had a new perspective which included the experiences of indepen-
dence and political rights. Thus the new man "came back with a different self-
consciousness from that with which he had left" the older order, and he "looked at
it through different eyes ..• " (Mead, 1936:59). As he turned back the years, he
noticed advantages of the older system--such as security--which he had not
appreciated earlier and he played the roles of the older order with an attitude of
"living over" the old life. From this experience of turning from the present to
play the roles of the past, to appreciate its advantages, and to live over what
else he could, the romanticist reconstructed his own self, developed a new self
awareness, a new form of himself. Mead provides a succinct summary of this
collective self notion:
Europe discovered the medieval period in the Romantic period, then;
but it also discovered itself. In fact, it discovered itself first.
Furthermore, it discovered the apparatus by means of which this self-
discovery was possible. The self belongs to the reflexive mode. One
senses the self only in so far as the self assumes the role of another
so that it becomes both subject and object in the same experience.
This is the thing of great importance in this whole historical move-
ment. It was because people in Europe, at this time, put themselves
back in the earlier attitude that they could come back upon them-
selves. When they had done this, they could contact themselves with
the earlier period and the selves which it brought forth. As a
characteristic of the romantic attitude we find the assumption of
roles. Not only does one go out into adventure taking now this,
that or another part, living this exciting poignant experience and
that, but one is constantly coming back upon himself, perhaps
reflecting upon the dullness of his own existence as compared with
the adventure at an earlier time which he is living over in his
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imagination. He has got the point of view from which he can see him-
self as others see him. And he has got it because he has put himself
in the place of the others (1936:63).
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The details of the development of the individual self, are, of course, much
better known by sociologists. There is the child who at first lacks organization
of experience and slowly acquires it by playing the roles of others, first singly
and then in some sort of interrelation, who learns to abide by the rules of the
game and eventually responds to the general social attitudes of the community in
terms of a generalized other. The unity of even the most primitive form of
response by the child is never in question, but of course the organization of
attitudes of those around him which he acquires through role playing, leads him
to develop a much more complex unity over time. Eventually, the mature individual
is able to judge himself from the perspective of all of the others in his environ-
ment. This judgment is the sign of true self consciousness. The individual self
is thus an emergent, something more than the assemblage of conditions and
attitudes of others, and indeed it is something unique, for every individual
develops his own perspective or point of view.
Within the self there are further phases which interact, namely the "me" and
the "l." It is the "me" which answers to the organized attitudes of others and
gives the "form" and structure to the self, while the "I" remains the unconventional,
the novel, and the unpredictable. Most members of society have a moderate balance
between these two phases of the self, but variations are possible and do exist. The
artist, for instance, is a person in whom the novel part of the self is developed
to a much higher degree, and the "me" or conventional aspect exists only in a minimal
manner. Still, both phases must always be present, for it is through their inter-
action that the higher form emerges.
Both forms of the self can thus be said to entail the reciprocity of inter-
action between a simpler subjective form and its objective, human environment, the
emergence of more complex wholes through assuming for a time established patterns
of behavior (roles) belonging to others earlier in time or differing in status,
and the eventual development of an awareness of oneself as an object and the ability
to make judgments about oneself. These selves are never static, but always continue
to change within the social process. Thus they are not "types" in Mead's sense of
static, unchanging abstractions (Mead 1936:409).
Mead also considered society or social organization as a social form. Since
fulfillment of the needs for food and reproduction are essential to the survival
of any living organism, no creature "could exist or maintain itself in complete
isolation from other living organisms" (Mead, 1934:228-336). On the human level
this relationship to others, to society, lead to the crucial emergence of self and
mind.
Like many other scholars of the turn of the century, Mead was committed not
only to evolutionary theoretical formulations, but he generally agreed with the
substantive content of these theories. Thus he incorporated into his social
psychology the same stages of societal evolution found in other writings: for
example, primitive, feudal, early industrial, etc. In addition he also compared
human societies to those found among the insects--especially the ants and bees--
and the vertebrates. Ants and bees, he observed, have a complex organization based
on special physiological plasticity, so that there is "a different type of form
adjusted to certain function" (1934:230). Among the vertebrates different organiza-
tional patterns are found, which are not yet human. Fishes, birds and cattle have
a rather loose form of social life which provides them with defense and protection.
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Human societies, no matter how simple or complex, entail several critical
differences from those found on the lower, animal levels: language communication
(especially the use of significant symbols) and the existence of selves. Mead
posits human interaction to occur, as the Romantic idealists had held, between a
subject and an object, with his own peculiar modification, that the subject or
self must arise from the social context. Today society and the existence of a
community of attitudes always precedes the existence of selves, but at first human
social organization was "merely a resultant of, and wholly dependent upon, the
physiological differentiations and demands of the individual organisms implicated
in it" (Mead, 1934:227). These were the necessary
lower stages of the human social process ..• because minds and
selves, consciousness and intelligence, could not otherwise have
emerged . • . because . • . some sort of an ongoing social process
in which human beings were implicated must have been there in
advance of the existence of minds and selves in human beings, in
order to make possible the development, by human beings, of minds
and selves ... (Mead, 1934:227),
Thus the physiological differentiation of the earliest human form led to primitive
forms of social organization which in turn were the forerunners of more recent
forms of social organization.
Rather than describing societies as wholes, however, Mead focused on several
critical institutions, tracing them from certain basic physiological tendencies.
These "forms" of social organization are the major means for progress, the growth
of universality in social interaction, and in the course of history they take one
form or another. Ultimately the general life process is moving toward a complex
and universal form of social organization, a society "in which the individual
members are interrelated in a multiplicity of different intricate and complicated
ways " and where they share more interests, have more individuality, and
more highly developed selves (Mead, 1934:307).
For human social organization and behavior the most impor~ant physiological
impulse, the need for sex and reproduction, is the basis of the institution of the
family. The family, in turn, is the fundamental unit of social organization and
"all such larger units or forms of human social organization as the clan or the
state .... " "Kindliness, helpfulness, and assistance" are in "the very structure
of the individuals in a human community" (Mead, 1934:258) and they are the basis
of religious institutions. These manifest themselves in neighborliness and tend
to move human interaction into universal association. Social reconstruction is
largely the outcome of these religious attitudes, and in this connection Mead
examines the major universal religions of Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and Christianity.
Finally, man also has economic inclinations, such as a tendency to exchange surplus
goods, and such exchanges occur whenever men are able to communicate with one
another. Once an attitude of production develops, it quickly leads to the
establishment of markets, means for transportation, media of exchange, banking
systems, etc., thereby increasing the economic interdependencies through the world
(Mead, 1934:258, 291).
Although Mead refers all of these institutional forms to basic human,
physiological impulses, he does not thereby imply either a biological or an environ-
mental determinism. Rather he proposed an intricate theory of sensitivity with
which he hoped to avoid the ontological problems of the existence of objects in the
natural world. He maintained that each living organism creates its own environ-
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ment by virtue of its peculiar sensory mechanisms; man is aware and responds to
that part of the natural world which his senses allow him to perceive. This does
not mean that a tree exists only when a man looks at it. But the objective world
relevant to the emergence of the human form is that world which human sensory
equipment allows man to perceive. When an adult is socialized his environment
includes the interests and values of the generalized others around him. "It is the
sensitivity of the organism that determines what its environment shall be, and in
that sense we can speak of a form as determining its environment" (Mead, 1934:328,
my emphasis). ----
Perhaps the most important emergent from the social process--at least with
respect to social behavior--is the development of mind. Mind is the one aspect of
human social behavior not shared in any way with the creatures of the animal
kingdom; it is unique to man. It alone requires a conscious reflexiveness which
involves on the one hand a potential awareness of the whole social process and on
the other a conscious taking of the collective attitudes of others and adjusting
to them. Mind is not self, for although both are emergent wholes or unities,
mind is restricted to conscious thought:
The unity of the mind is not identical with the unity of the self. The
unity of the self is constituted by the unity of the entire relational
pattern of social behavior and experience in which the individual is
implicated, and which is reflected in the structure of the self; but
many of the aspects or features of this entire pattern do not enter into
consciousness, so that the unity of the mind is in a sense an abstraction
from the more inclusive unity of the self (Mead, 1934:144, fn.).
The functions of mind is best seen in the context of the various "forms of
social conduct" (Mead, 1934:357, 354-378). Although Mead gives a long and detailed
analysis of four of these forms, he does not himself label them nor does he always
make sharp, categorical distinctions between and among them. It must be remembered
that Mead assumed that animal behavior is based on instinctual tendencies, which,
once they are evoked, must move directly to certain fulfillments or be entirely
negated; and human behavior arises from basic impulses which could lead to various
responses in spite of obstacles, conflicts, or interruptions.
The first or simplest form of social conduct occurring both on the animal and
the human levels "may be defined as that conduct arising out of impulses whose
specific stimuli are found in other individuals belonging to the same biologic
group" (Mead, 1934:357). These stimuli, which Wundt called gestures, may appeal to
any of the senses and in their simpler forms tend to call forth instinctive or
impulsive responses, often of a motor sort. Examples can be cited from the lower
animal species, such as the bees, ants, beavers, etc., who have no past or future,
no self as an object, no reflection and no rational conduct. The relationship is
simply one of stimulus and response.
A second form of conduct is one in which the animal providing the stimulus
evokes the same response in itself as in others. Some birds heighten their own
responses at the same time that they evoke other birds to sing, and some dogs howl,
stimulating others as well as themselves. This self-stimulation by the use of
gestures is a second form of conduct.
Immature human conduct exemplifies the third form. It does not yet exhibit
the existence of mind although a self is in the process of emergence. Mead assumes
that the child's behavior is based on impulses and, since they are universal to
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humans, these will involve a common meaning of conduct based on them. Basically the
child stimulates himself to respond in the same fashion as others do to him: so he
utters soothing sounds to his own crying just as he later plays more complicated
adult roles and responds to them. Given the many years of human dependence, the
child plays roles of others for a long period of time. Yet he expresses adult
responses only incompletely, and thus his responses are relatively truncated or
immature in contrast to animal forms which instinctively express complete responses.
Moreover, the child responds only to the role as a stimulus; he does not grasp
the role as a whole. During these years of role playing, self-consciousness
slowly arises as the child addresses himself from the perspective of various other
roles and gradually comes to integrate those responses. Nor does the taking of the
role of others stop with childhood. Adults still perform this taking the role of
others when, as parents, they take the role of the crying infant. Indeed, this
taking the role of a helpless person--an extension of the parental attitude--is the
expression of universal sympathy.
The fourth and final form of conduct is one involving mind, which, of course,
is not a substance but a process. It is:
. • • constructive or reflective or problem-solving thinking, is the
socially acquired means or mechanism or apparatus whereby the human
individual solves the various problems of environmental adjustment which
arise to confront him in the course of his experience, and which prevent
his conduct from proceeding harmoniously on its way, until they have
thus been dealt with. And mind or thinking is a1so--as possessed by the
individual members of human society--the means or mechanism or apparatus
whereby social reconstruction is effected or accomplished (Mead, 1934:308).
Once the roles of others have become organized, and the biological individual
responds to them and to himself as an organized personality, a self, then he can
begin to view himself consciously as responsive to a variety of expectations of
others and of himself--as friend, competitor, a good sport, etc. The world becomes
one of composite objects with a variety of functions, features and taboos, and
man becomes a rational animal. Problematic conduct passes into a reflective form,
the subject being the biological individual and the object being the self adjusting
itself to an environment.
When conduct becomes reflective, it means essentially that the self enlarges
the realm of objective alternatives as well as altering the temporal sequences by
means of imagery. Images which gather about vocal gestures of the act either as
stimuli or as attitudes to action, may be simply percepts or they may be ideas
associatedwith phases of the act which are not there in the immediately perceived
present. They may have originated in past experience, but they allow man to recon-
struct the social act in terms of possible, alternative goals or plans for the
future as well as interpretations of the past. For lack of a better locus, Mead
places images in the mind. The primary purpose of reflection, thought, and mind is
to determine alternative courses of action, imagining alternative results or
responses.
From the above descriptions it is evident that Mead conceived of forms as the
emergences from a fundamental process encompassing all life forms. These forms
have real existence and are not merely conventional labels applied arbitrarily to
some sort of behavior. Their emergence can be described as the adjustment of a
prior or simpler form to its conditions of life. Forms are always wholes, unities,
or configurations, and their relationship to their environment is of determining
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significance. Forms may have subvarieties. No form is ever static or absolute;
they are always adjusting to new conditions, and many social forms seem to be
changing toward some sort of universalism or perfection. Social roles may be
grasped as wholes, but usually a role is used to refer to visible behavior on the
part of others which the actor is imitating or otherwise using as a model or
stimulus for his own development.
II
Although Schutz succeeded Mead by a generation, the roots of both men's
theories were deeply embedded in similar European and American intellectual
traditions, including neo-Kantianism, the researches in the newer psychology, and
the writings of Henri Bergson and William James. Still their solutions to the
problems of human behavior veered in different directions, Mead bearing toward a
dynamic system built on his interpretation of Hegel and Darwin, and Schutz inclining
more sharply toward an intricate social typology based on the philosophy of Husserl
and the sociology of Max Weber.
A complete, even schematic summary of Schutz' system is beyond the scope of
this paper, but a few highlights as they pertain to his use of types and typicali-
ties will be attempted. 2
As an admirer of Edmund Husserl, Schutz was notably influenced by several
aspects of the philosopher's work, primarily in the realm of psychological pheno-
menology rather than his eidetic or transcendental phenomenologies. Husserl had
contended that one should seek to describe, not causally explain, the phenomena of
the mind, that is, subjects and their intended meanings. Thus one should begin with
immediate experience of conscious human beings in the everyday world. Such
experience is always directed toward some object, for consciousness is by its very
nature always consciousness of something. The only question is toward which object
is one's attention directed,-and this depends upon one's perspective as an actor,
other or observer, one's system of relevance, and one's biographical history. The
philosophical problem of the reality of the outer world which is experienced,
Husserl left in "brackets," that is, for the time being he by-passed it. In
directing his attention at objects of his world, the individual does not merely
perceive single objects, proposed Husserl, rather he engages in a special process
of "pairing." Pairing occurs through apperception and appresentation and the
results are not consciously questioned but are taken for granted. Apperception is
the spontaneous interpretation of sensory perception in terms of past experiences
and previously acquired knowledge of the perceived object; appresentation is an
actual experience which refers to another experience not perceptually given, such
as seeing the front of a building and having images of its inside and back. Through
these processes man associates objects from various perceptual, referential and
interpretational systems; he associates types with particulars or vice versa, one's
own cogitations with those of one's fellow men, and typical motives with typical
actions.
From the writings of Max Weber, Schutz derived his focus on the interpretative
understanding of social action. However, after careful reexamination of Weber's
work, he concluded that Weber had not differentiated the notion of motivation
clearly enough. While retaining Weber's commitment to ideal types, Schutz was much
more careful to distinguish the perspective from which typical motives are attri-
buted to social action. As a result of both influences, Schutz formulated a phenom-
enological theory including an examination of the nature of the self, intersubject-
ivity, and the structure of the social world.
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American readers of Schutz' works must remember however, that even though he
is referred to as a sociologist, he did not automatically share all the American
assumptions about science and scientific method. In his The Phenomenology of the
Social World he noted that this work was the result of "rigorous philosophical
reflection" (1967:xxxi). His conception of his problem as the establishment of an
objective understanding of subjective human behavior) must be viewed in the context
of the European distinction between the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissen-
schaften. Schutz contrued the world of the natural sciences as containing facts
and an observational field which were not or pre-interpreted. There-
fore the natural scientist could follow specified rules of procedure in his exami-
nation of them. The social world, in contrast, is pre-selected in terms of
systems of relevance appropriate to the Lebenswelt and the "multiple realities" to
which the actors belong. The types of action, typical motives, means, projects--
in short, all the objects and observational fields of the social sciences are pre-
selected by the actors living in a social world, and this necessitates different
methods in the scientific study of social action.
All actors experience their world from the outset in terms of types and
typicalities. This involves no judgment, for through apperception all experience
is paired with previous experience, though the type may thereby be enlarged and
divided into sub-types. Such types are taken for granted. Indeed it is characteris-
tic of the world of everyday life that we take for granted the physical objects as
we see them, the socia-cultural world as we have been taught to experience it, and
our fellow men as sharing these typicalities. At times, however, as a result of
interests from other systems of relevance, the taken for granted world may be
questioned. Interests are the forces which move individuals to action, to project
goals into the future in terms of the experience of the past, and to re-define the
applicability of given types.
With respect to the use of types Schutz makes two crucial assumptions, that
all knowledge entails constructs, and that names are merely conventions.
All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific
thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generaliza-
tions, formalizations, idealizations specific to the respective level
of thought organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things
as facts selected from a universal context by the activities of the
mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts. • . . This does
not mean that, in daily life or in science, we are unable to grasp the
reality of the world. It just means that we grasp merely certain aspects
of it, namely those which are relevant to us ... (1967:5).
To this basic premise must be added the second one, borrowed from Aristotle, that
names are merely conventions. In his discussion of marks, indications, signs and
symbols, Schutz noted Aristotle's position that "Spoken words are the symbols of
mental experience.... Just as all men do not have the same writing, so all
men do not have the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences .•. are the
same for all" (1967:291). Schutz accepts this same universality of human
experiences and the variability of symbols and quotes again from Aristotle that
"a name is a sound significant by convention." And he concluded that "language
and artificial signs in general are matters of conventions. But the concept of
convention presupposes the existence of society and also the possibility of some
communication... " (1967:291). The significance of these assumptions for Schutz'
entire orientation becomes evident in his interpretation of the cognitive
structures of everyday life and of science, especially those phases having to do
with human conduct.
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The world of everday life has structure as a result of the thought objects
which human beings living in a given social world have es.tablished 'to help them
get their bearings in their soci.a-cultural world. Unli.ke Mead and other
sociologists, Schutz does not concern himself with the genetic process whereby
the child acquires these thought structures. Instead he simply begins with the
fully mature adult, the wide-awake, grown-up man. The world in which he lives
existed before his birth as an organized world, and his interpretations of it are
based on a "stock of previous experiences" handed down to him from his parents and
teachers which becomes his "stock of knowledge at hand." He interprets objects as
having more or less definite qualities as well as horizons of familiarity, and he
takes such knowledge for granted unless or until questioned by some special circum-
stance. These taken for granted, pre-experiences are from the outset accepted as
typical and as somehow linked with anticipated similar experiences. Through apper-
ception men experience mountains, trees, fellow men, et cetera, and not an arrange-
ment of unique objects. Thus experience will confirm the type, sometimes enlarging
it and further subdividing it, or it may be interpreted as a more unique object
with a different form of typicality. In the long run it is the "selecting activity"
of the mind which determines to which typicalities an object or event is related,
and this selection depends on the system of relevance.
In spite of the fact that men live in a world of typicalities, they are still
unique individuals by virtue of their own peculiar biographical histories. Each
event and every action is uniquely his own in the sense that physically each man
can only be in a certain place at a certain time and can have only his own accumula-
tion of social experiences, his own history. Given his own past, he has his own
unique future and his own purposes at hand for which he utilizes whatever knowledge
he possesses. Although the cultural tradition provides him with typical knowledge,
information and relevance systems, it is his own unique situation which determines
the actual selectivity at any given time. Most investigations of the common sense
would proceed with an investigation of the acting individual and his private world.
But our world is really an intersubjective one because we live and work among
other men, we understand others and they understand us, and we live in a world of
culture, that is, a texture of meanings which has been instituted by human actions
of the past and present. Cultural objects are understood primarily in terms of
the function they have for those who originated and use them. There are three
assumptions in connection with intersubjectivity which need comment. First we take
for granted that there is a reciprocity of perspectives, that is, we assume that
intelligent fellow men exist and have access to the same knowledge as we ourselves,
but that given their own peculiar place in space and time, they will have a somewhat
different perspective. If individuals were to interchange positions, they would
have a similar perspective as long as their systems of relevance are the same.
A second assumption with respect to the social nature of knowledge is that
only "a very small part of my knowledge of the world originates within my personal
experience" (Schutz, 1967:13). Knowledge is simply transmitted through friends,
parents or teachers, and possess typical features. In addition to this accumula-
tion of typical constructs the individual learns how to construct typicalities in
accordance with the accepted system of relevance. The foremost medium for all
typification is language, both vocabulary and syntax. Finally, knowledge is not
evenly distributed throughout society. Individuals within the social world learn
that knowledge varies in clarity, distinctness, precision and familiarity, and
individuals within the social world share it differentially. Some knowledge is
mastered by specialists or by other groups in the society with the result that
there is a social distribution of knowledge.
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Some of the common sense constructs used in the social world for its typifica-
tion derive directly from the nature of intersubjectivitYt from the relations of the
actor with others. From the perspective of the acting individual, the social
world is comprised of an "r" and a "we," "you," and a "they" depending on how the
actor includes himself as a point of reference. In addition, "r" exist at this
moment in time, but there were people before my time upon whom I can no longer act
but whose actions may still influence me, they are my predecessors. Those who
share my time period are my contemporaries; and those who follow are my successors,
for I cannot experience them, but I may orient my actions toward them. Relations
with these types of fellow men may vary in terms of intimacy of anonymity,
familiarity or strangeness, and intensity or extensity. Contemporaries, or those
with whom I share the present, are further differentiated into consociates, or
persons with whom I also share my special world; we exist in the same face-to-face
world and are mutually involved in one another's biographies; we grow old together;
we live in a pure "we" relationship. Using Bergson's concept of duration, con-
sociates may be grasped in their unique individuality because they share the same
duree. But the other relationships are the ones in which typical reactions are
involved:
In all the other forms of social relationship ... the fellow-man's
self can merely be grasped by a 'contribution of imagination of hypo-
thetical meaning presentation... that is, by forming constructs of
a typical way of behavior, a typical pattern of underlying motives,
of typical attitudes of a personality type, ... of which the Other
and his conduct •.. are just instances or exemplars (Schutz, 1967:17).
Such a system of structures includes "course of action types" and various "personality
types." Usually as the anonymity increases, less content will be involved in each
type, that is, fewer aspects of personality and behavior will be part of the type.
As the actor typifies the conduct of his fellow men, he constructs the other
as a partial self, as a performer of typical roles, -- as for example, bus driver,
tax collector, producer, etc., and he thereby engages in self typicification as
passenger, taxpayer, consumer, etc. Thus in typifying others' behaviors the actor
typifies himself in a partial way. (Schutz identified this notion with Mead's "I"
and "me," but it would be more accurate to associate it with Mead's concept of self
and role.) Most if these types or roles are socially derived from members of the
in-group and are socially approved, indeed frequently they are institutionalized.
The "course of action types" in terms of which individuals relate to others are
meaningful in the context of social action. Schutz distinguished between "act" and
"action" meaning by the latter human conduct devised by the actor beforehand, while
"act" refers to the completed conduct. The course of action type refers to conduct
as yet uncompleted and as such it must involve a phantasied or imagined "project"
or anticipated outcome. These projects are based on the actors knowledge at hand
at a given time including experience with performing the act previously. Projecting
thus involves repetition, or what Husserl had called the idealization of "I-can-do-
it-again," namely the assumption that "I may under typically similar circumstances
act in a way typically similar to that in which I acted before in order to bring
about a typically similar state of affairs."
Obviously there is in all repetition of activity the experience of a previous
trial which then becomes a factor in making the second action slightly different
from the first. Having a second baby is different from having the first. But
Schutz LnrLs t ed that in the idealization of the "I-can-do-it-again" the actor is
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merely interested in the typicalities of the action, the typical intitial action
"A," the circumstances "e," and the anticipated state of affairs "S."
Course of action types include not only a project based on the I-can-do-it-
again idealization, but they entail a motive. As a result of his study of Max
Weber's ideal types of social action, Schutz concluded that there are essentially
two kinds of motives. From the point of view of the observer the motives may
refer to the experiences and conditions which determined the act and of which the
actor is himself not particularly aware. These latter are the "because" motives.
In typifying behavior these two kinds of motives must be distinguished.
Even though types of action exist and are widely used on the common sense
level of everyday life, the study of behavior in terms of its rationality must
occur on a higher, that is, a scientific, plane. The basic reason for this is that
behavior may be interpreted or understood from at least three per5pectives--that of
the actor, of the other person, and of the observer. Since each one of these
persons has his own biographical experiences and peculiar problems at hand, his
interpretations will be more or less different. And this difference comes to play
a role in the interpretation of the "rationality" of behavior. Indeed, what is
reasonable, sensible, or rational varies considerably.
We may say that someone acted "sensibly" if his "action is in accordance with
a socially approved set of rules and recipes for coming to terms with typical
problems by applying typical means for achieving typical ends" (Schutz, 1967:27).
Sensible behavior requires no insight into one's motives or the means-ends context;
it may simply involve a strong emotional reaction which others would also expect
under similar circumstances. If an action which seems sensible to an observer also
entails a "judicious choice" on the part of the actor, it may be called reasonable,
even if simply habitual or traditional. Rational action, which is considered
categorically different from affectual or traditional action, assumes that the
actor has a clear and distinct insight into the ends, the means, and the secondary
results and thus the alternatives on all levels of action. This interpretation is
especially difficult to apply on the common sense level because both the actor and
the observer may have different points of view. It can occur only 'within an
unquestioned and undetermined frame of constructs of typicalities of the setting,
the motives, the means and ends, the courses of action and personalities involved
and taken for granted (Schutz, 1967:33). Both the actor and the fellow man must
take these typicalities for granted and they must share certain cultural assumptions
for the concept of rationality to be at all applicable. At best it will be only
a partial rationality, a matter of degree. Moreover, rational insight into
action patterns decreases with the increase in the anonymity of the situation. In
spite of all these difficulties, rational understanding of subjective behavior is
possible, but Schutz seeks this on the scientific level where the models of
rational behavior can be described in accordance with specified rules.
The scientific structure of the social world is built upon the common-sense
typicalities, of interpretations of action by the actor, but it must be more
specifically defined. While the common sense world is concerned with practical
workings, the scientific world is concerned with cognitive understanding. There-
fore its explanation of social reality must adhere to the ultimate goal of pro-
viding "objective concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of subjective
meaning structures" (Schutz, 1967:62). Scientific constructs must be what Schutz
calls second level constructs, that is, free from the biographical situation of the
scientist and possessing relatively few connotative meanings. The system of
relevance on this second level of constructs is the scientific situation and the
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scientific problem. The scientist uses the stock of knowledge which belongs to his
discipline, including the methods for forming constructs.
In the analysis of social action the scientist proceeds somewhat as follows.
Having observed certain events, he constructs typical courses of action patterns
and coordinates them with personal types of actors, whom he imagines as having
consciousness. To this fictitious consciousness he ascribes typical "in order to"
motives corresponding to the goals of the observed action and typical "because"
motives upon which the "in order to" motives are based. Both types of motives are
assumed to be invariant. In a sense, the scientist has created models or puppets
whose actions, given a constructed stock of knowledge, make the action subjectively
understandable. Such an homunculus knows no emotional states of hope and fear, he
is not free to choose, and thus cannot have conflicting interests or make errors.
He can have only those characteristics which the scientist has ascribed to him.
Given such an homunculus, the scientist can create others until he has a network
of interlocking actors with appropriate motives and goals. Only such a scientific
model is truly rational, for all the difficulties of real actors have been eliminated
(Schutz, 1967:40-43).
There are three restrictions which are placed on such scientific constructions:
1) logical consistency, 2) subjective interpretation, and 3) adequacy. He contended
that scientific constructs would remain consistent with common sense types only if
the conceptual framework remained compatible with the principles of formal logic,
if it was stated in terms of motives and goals or outcomes--because that is the
way the mind works--and if the constructed model made sense and was understandable
to the actor on the everyday life level.
Schutz was convinced that rational models of behavior could be used in the
social sciences in a variety of ways. Patterns of social interaction could be
studied in isolation if the actors behave rationally within the sets of conditions,
means, ends, and motives. Rational behavior of constructed types is by definition
predictable and thus could be used as a standard for the ascertainment of deviant
behavior. And finally several models or sets of models of rational action could
be developed and compared, and the most adequate selected for further use.
III
The preceding presentation of some of the usages of forms and types in the
writings of Mead and Schutz permit a few comparable observations, some comments
on their methodological implications, and finally some indications of their
consequences for theory construction and sociological research.
Etymologically the words have had similar meanings. "Form" traces its origins
to the Latin word "forma" meaning figure, model, mold, and sort, which during the
history of thought came to mean more directly structure and patterns and even
essence--as a result of the scholastics' distinction of substance and essence. In
Kant, of course, forms were associated with the a priori categories of the mind.
"Type" had its roots in both Greek and Latin and meant kind, class or group, and
later an individual or thing embodying certain characteristic qualities.
Significantly, a type has "recurrent, general, distinctive features which are not
properties of the individual as such," writes Tiryakian, and while types are parts
of classificatory systems, forms belong to the study of morphology (1968:178).
Mead and Schutz' use of the terms as referring to unities, patterns, and configura-
tions is thus consistent with thei~ etymological derivations.
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Although sociologists do not generally distinguish between structure and
classification, it is evident from the writings of Mead and Schutz, that the
contexts within which forms and types occur is quite different. For Mead forms
are realities within a larger social process, they are the configurations which
emerge in the course of the dynamics of life, while for Schutz types are static
idealizations of patterns of behavior, motives, actions, goals, etc., which are
logically interrelated with other types into a total system--common sense,
scientific, religious, etc., whatever other realms of the "multiple realities"
prevail.
It is consistent with these distinctions of intellectual contexts that Mead
was more interested in the explanation of the emergence of form and Schutz in the
descriptions and understanding of the prevailing types. Living in the era in
which he did, Mead's interests were in the origins and development of social
behavior, and in the scientific social control of the processes of evolution and
social reconstruction. He assumed that causal processes operated with respect to
human behavior just as they did for the world of nature, and that social scientists
were to discover these natural laws. The explanation of the emergence of social
forms was intimately linked to this problem.
Schutz was caught up in the aftermath of the polemic between the Naturwissen-
schaften and the Geisteswissenschaften, and thus he was concerned with ~he
objective ordering of the social world and social action, and the structuring and
defining of its parts. He therefore stressed careful description of the types
of motives, means and goals taken for granted in the world of everyday life and
their refinement for use of the scientific level. Types and typicalities could
then become elements in his larger theoretical system. While Mead had searched
for explanations of the emergence of forms, Schutz assumed types and sought to
describe and define them.
Sociologists today may find both forms and types useful in their work, and
there is no reason why either notion should be arbitrarily preferred to the other.
Scientists interested in differentiating various kinds of social behavior may find
Schutz' approach more useful, while social reconstructionists might be more inclined
toward explanations of the processes whereby social forms have emerged. Using
Schutz' terms we might say that scientific sociology seems to have not one but
several systems of relevance.
In the application of both types and forms there are, however, some basic
difficulties which the empirical scientist cannot overlook. At some point or
other there must be reliance on subjective judgment. Neither term is the result
simply of combining or adding a series of attributes or characteristics to make
a whole; both positions assume that the whole is greater than the parts. Therefore
they both necessitate human judgment either in establishing the form or type or
in allocating individual instances to it. Just as Darwin realized that a naturalist
determines a given species from a combination of observations and judgments, so
Mead's notion of the "me" as the form of the "I," or of social institutions as
forms of social organization entailed a subjective judgment. Schutz encountered
similar difficulties. In his paper on the ~tranger, he defines the stranger and
then accord~ng to his own best judgments selects aspects of this social type for
closer examination. Thus subjective judgment enters either at the point of
formulating the whole or in the selection of the characteristics which are
essential to it.
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Once established, a form or whole, if it is to be used in science, must be
related to particular instances, and here again the interpretation of the
scientist enters in. If both types and forms are wholes which are somehow more
than the separate parts, and if, in addition, they are idealizations, that is,
typicalities not expected to correspond to the particular instances, then how is a
particular instance ascribed to such a type or form? Schutz partially avoided the
issue by assuming that all named objects are types. However, he was faced with
the issue of ascribing the correct type to an object. As indicated earlier, he
relied on Russerl's notion of apperception and appresentation to make this
association, and on the scientific level he relied on consensus of the scientific
community. According to Mead's position, forms could only be exemplified by par-
ticulars, at the discretion of the scientist, or vice versa, the scientist could
by his subjective judgment interpret a particular as being an illustration of a
given form. This problem has been tackled in an empirical manner recently by
Harold Garfinkel who attempted to determine the actual criteria used by individuals
in allocating instances of death to various types of suicide (Garfinkle, 1967:
esp. Chap. I, pp. 17-18). Schutz' writings seem particularly helpful in
connection with these types of problems because he stresses the taken for granted
phases of social life.
The criteria for our subjective judgments and our taken for granted behavior
are part of what Schutz has called systems of relevance. By suggesting that these
systems may vary from one culture to another, he has taken a position rather
different from Mead and the earlier social scientists who believed in the un~ty of
the natural world, the unity of all science, and the universality of human interests.
Accepting the variability of systems of relevance means that the social sciences
should build their theories around the variations of human interests. For the
sociology of knowledge such an orientation may mean a new lease on life by providing
a more focused problem formulation. And indeed there are projects under way seeking
to establish just these existential or folk typologies and systems of relevance. 3
There remains only one more major problem which affects the research scientist:
the problem of change. Mead's dynamic system provides more flexibility at this
point since he allows for the constant modification and the re-emergence of new
forms in accordance with the interaction of the existing form with its environing
conditions. Social roles, social conduct, institutions and selves may all be
different tomorrow from what they are today. But in typologies the system is fixed
and the types are static, usually defined in terms of essential characteristics.
And for such systems change is a difficult problem. Schutz has tried to allow for
some flexibility by allowing open horizons for the types on the common sense level,
but his types on the scientific level are much more rigid and thus difficult to
change. In the social sciences the phenomena do change--witness the different kinds
of criminal offenses today from those of fifty years ago: With this problem of
change we have arrived full circle at the problem of the origin of types and forms.
For Schutz who simply assumed the existence of types, the creation of new types
becomes a major scientific obstacle.
While this paper has not solved any of the problems pertainipg to the formation
and use of generalizing concepts in the social sciences, it is hoped that it has
provided some enlightenment with respect to selected, basic problems. Neither types
nor forms are arbitrarily created, although the ultimate test of the one is found
in the natural world and the other on the level of human consensus. In the
opinion of this writer, Schutz has indeed raised a series of fruitful topics to
which sociologists may address themselves, including the criteria of social types
and scientific types, the determination of social objects and social rules which
Forms and Types in the Study of Human Behavior 109
are taken for granted" and the question whether social life is Lndaed a network of
types and typicalities and not the idiosyncratic world most sociologists have
usually assumed.
Footnotes
1Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Dengin, 1970:28; Schutz, 1967:Vol. I, pp. 19, 189,
216-217, 223-225.
2The following summary is based primarily on Schutz, 1967b; Schutz, 1970: Vol. I,
esp. pp. 3-47, 207-245, and Wagner, 1970.
3For instance the anthropological works of C. R. Leach and Rodney Needham in England
and Claude Levi-Strauss in France.
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